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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARRINER W. ME·RRILL FAM-
ILY FOUNDATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 






ON WRIT OF' CERTIORARI 
from 
THE S.TATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Matter is before the Court on a Writ of Cer-
tiorari. 
The plaintiff, the Marriner W. Merrill Family Foun-
dation, Inc., was ·duly and regularly incorporated under 
the Laws of the State of Utah as a non-profit organiza-
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tion on September 7, 1950. Subsequent to this incorpora-
tion, the Corporation Franchise Tax Section of the State 
Tax Commission of Utah did on or about October 24, 
' 1950, assess against this corporation the minimum fran-
chise tax in the amount of $10.00. 
The plaintiff filed a protest and petition with said 
Commissioner and requested a re-determination, which 
said petition culminated in a hearing before a legally 
constituted quorum of the Commission on the 13th day 
of August, 1953, in a proceeding entitled ''IN THE MAT-
TER OF THE CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX 
HEARING OF MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, INC." 
On April 1, 1954, the said Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision 
whereby the said Commission found that the :l\1arriner 
W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. \Vas a taxable corp-
oration unde~r Title 59, Chap~ter 13, Utah Code, Annotated, 
1953, that the Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, 
Inc. was not organized an~d operated exclusively for re-
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational pur-
poses and the net earnings can inure to a private share-
holder or individual and therefore said corporation was 
adjudged to he a corporation which does not ·come within 
any of the exemptions provided in Title 59, Chapter 13, 
Section 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As a result of 
this determination, the plaintiff filed its petition of Writ 
of Certiorari on April28, 1954, with the Writ being made 
returnable May 18, 1954. 
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At the formal hearing before the State Tax Commis-
sioner there vvas introduced in evidence the Affidavit 
of Incorporation (Tax Commissioner's Exhibit No. 1), 
the By-Laws of the F·oundation, (Taxpayer's Exhibit 
"A"), and oral testimony. 
The purpose of the Foundation, as set forth in the 
Affidavit of Incorporation, is as follows: 
"* * * for the purpose of receiving by gift, devise, 
bequest, or otherwise, n1oney or ·credits, and other 
items of real and personal property, and to invest 
and reinvest the same and to apply the income 
therefrom, together with so much of the principal 
thereof as may be deemed necessary and advisable 
for loaning or otherwise advancing money and 
property, on such terms as the Board of Directors 
may determine, to any and all descendents and 
husbands or wives of such descendents of Marrin-
er W. Merrill, whether or not such person is a 
member of said corporation, for the educational 
uses in any school, college, university, or special 
training institutions, in any part of the world and 
without ~n any way limiting or restricting the 
general purposes hereinbefore stated, to aid and 
assist financially or otherwise in the training of 
any member of the family, whether the same be 
a direct descendent or by marriage, in the acquir-
ing of scholastic training and educational advan-
cement in religious, literary, scientific, artistic, 
professional, vocational or smiliar branches of 
learning, conditioned only upon the control of the 
assets of said Corporation for the aforesaid uses 
thereof by the Directors of said Corpora-
tion ; * * *. " 
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The By-Laws of the Foundation \Vere a'dn1itted as 
Taxpayer's Exhibit "A" ( T. 15). The portions specifi-
cnlly ap,plicable to the question herein are: 
Article ·One, Section Two, -
''Said Foundation shall receive and accept 
from any member ·or any other person, either by 
gift, devise, bequest, or otherwise, any money, 
credit, or other types of real or personal property, 
all of which shall be handled and managed by the 
Board of Directors as hereinafter recited and for 
the uses and purposes of this ·corporation:" 
Article Four, Section Nine, -
''The Board of Directors may appoint a spec-
ial committee with power to accept contributions 
and to act upon all applications of prospective 
stude·nts for loans or other assistance from the 
Foundation, and such committee's decision in such 
matters shall always be subject to the right of 
ap,p,eal of such applicant to the Board of DireC-
tors:'' 
Article Five, Section One, -
''In order to earry out the objective of the Foun-
dation, the Board of Direetors, or a committee 
appointed by it, may receive, invest and reinvest, 
all funds and property of the Foundation, and 
may loan or otherwise advance to any applicant 
for assistance such funds as may be deemed prop-
er :and adequate £or the accomplishment of the 
purposes ·of said applicant and of this Founda-
ation. '' 
Article Five, Section Two, -
''Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill 
Family, either by blood or marriage, and \vhether 
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the same be a member of the Corporation or not, 
shall be entitled to borrow and receive from the 
Foundation such sums and amounts of money, 
and upon such terms, and at such rate of interest, 
as the Board of Directors may from time to time 
prescribe, which money, however, shall be used for 
the sole and exclusive purpose of assisting said 
applicant in attendance at such school, college, 
university, or special training institution, wher-
ever located, and for the purpose of educational, 
religious, professional, scientific, literary, artistic, 
vocational, or similar branches of learning; 
provided, nevertheless, that said Board of Direct-
ors, or the committee appointed by it, shall at 
.all times have ,complete power and discretion in 
determining whether the loan shall be made, and 
if made the amount, length of time, rate of inter-
est, and other eonditions of said loan, always bear-
ing in mind the amount of funds for such purpose, 
the number of applicants, and the expense incident 
thereto, with the objective of equitably dividing 
available funds for the aid of all applicants." 
Article Five, Section Three, -
''Said Board may also in its discretion assist 
any applicant to borrow at any bank or trust ,com-
pany for any of the purposes recited in Section 
two hereof, and the officers of this Corporation 
shall have the power to endorse or sign with said 
applicant any note at any such bank or trust com-
pany for such purposes and pledge as security for 
the payment thereof such asset of said Foundation 
as it may deem advisable and make such require-
ments of said applicant as it may deem proper.'' 
The only oral testin1ony received at the hearing was 
that of A. L. Merrill, called as a witness on behalf of the 
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Foundation (T. 8-12). Mr. !Ierrill is the President of 
the l\1:arriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. Dur-
ing his testimony it was stipulated ( T. 10) "That to date 
hereof there has been contributed to said corporation by 
interested members the total sum of $1,628.00. Two loans 
have been made to students for educational purposes: one 
to the grand-daughter of a sister of a wife of Marriner 
W. Merrill, but the gran·d-daughter, I understand, is not 
a descen.dent of any member of the family, for the pur-
pose of studying nursing in S:alt Lake City; and another 
loan to a great-grandson of Marriner \V. Merrill for his 
education at the Utah State Agricultural College." 
Mr. Merrill further testifie-d (T. 10) that "The· Affi-
davit is broad enough to permit the loaning of money to 
any descendent of a husband or a wife who subsequently 
married a member of the Merrill Family. This is so, even 
though such a person be not a descendent of Marriner W. 
Merrill.'' 
On page 11 of the Transcript is found the following: 
"MR. DAY: The beneficiary doe:s not necessarily 
have to be a. member of the corporation. 
''MR. MERRILL : No, the beneficiaries are not 
me·mhers of' th!at. They don't have to be members of the 
corporation, an·d in these instan·ces are not members of 
the corp'Oration. 
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"The money is donated with the understanding as 
provided in the Affidavit and By-Laws without any re-
fund or return to the donors 'Of any kind or eharacter, or 
by way of interest or dividends or otherwise; and that 
money is used exclusively in the future for the purpose 
of loaning money to students within the qualifications 
mentioned to go to college in any part of the world. And 
the objective of the Foundation is to provide for educa-
tional development of individuals that the Board of 
Directors may determine are within the rights under the 
Affidavit to make the loan. 
"I believe that is all. 
''MR. ALLEN: Counsel for the Commission will 
stipulate to the statement with the exception of the 
limitation that donors who are participants in the Affi-
davit itself may receive benefits from the corporation. 
''MR. MERRILL: I agree that there might be some 
instances where a donor might have a loan made to him, 
but he would have to pay it back just as anyone else. 
He would never receive it as a dividend or a refund of 
any amount he had ever paid. 
"MR. DAY: That last statement, may we have it 
understood, is testimony under oath and not part of the 
stipulation.'' 
The issue involved is whether or not the Marriner W. 
11errill Family Foundation, Inc. is an exempt corpora-
tion under the provisions of Section 59-13-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
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It is the position of the appellant that the Fol;lnda-
tion is for the purpose of receiving gifts, ·devises, be-
quests, or other properties from any donor to be used 
for the purpose of loaning or other"Tise advancing money 
or property on such terms as the Board of Directors 
might determine to any and all descendents and husbands 
or wives of such descendents of ~Iarriner W. Merrill for 
educational uses in any school, college, university, or 
special training institution in any part of the world. The 
loans are not restricted to members of the corporation 
and there is no return to any ·donor, either of principal, 
or interest, or dividend. The Foundation is solely for 
educational and ·charitable uses and for no other purpose. 
It is, therefore, ·claimed that this corporation Is 
exempt under the laws of the State of Utah. 
POINT I. 
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC. 
IS EXEMPT AS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND 
OPERATED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 
As an exemption from the Corporation Franchise 
Tax imposed by the State of Utah, Section 59-13-4, Utah 
C·ode Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
''The following corporations are exempt from 
the provisions of this chapter, to wit: 
"* * * 
'' (4) Corporations and any Community 
Chest, Fund or Foundation, organized and oper-
ated e~clusively for religious, charitable scienti-
fic, literary or educational purposes, 01: for the 
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prevention of cruelty to ·children or animals, no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the 
benefit ·of any private stockholder or individual." 
It is submitted that the Marriner W. Merrill Family 
Foundation, Inc. is organized and carried on for ·chari-
table and educational purposes within the above statute. 
This statute is an exact copy of Section 101 (6) 
Internal Revenue Code which exempts arganizations 
from income tax under the Federal Income Tax Laws. 
This section of the Utah Code, as far as we have been 
able to determine, has not been construed by the Courts 
in any manner applicable herein. However, the Federal 
Statute has been, in numerous instances, considered by 
the Courts. 
The best definition of charity in this regard is found 
in the case of Bok vs. McCaughn, 42 F. 2d 616. In this 
case, an association was formed to accept gifts and dona-
tions; and to, in turn, recognize and reward by payment 
of $10,000.00 the person selected each year as the one 
whose act or service was most advantageous to the City 
of Philadelphia or its inhabitants. 
The Court, on page 618, is quoted as follows: 
"Charity, derived from the Latin Caritas, 
·originally meant love. In the thirteenth chapter 
·of First Corinthians the revised version uses the 
wurd ''love in defining the third of the three 
cardinal virtues which, in King James' version 
read ''Faith, Hope and Charity.'' It was with 
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similiar emphasis on the motive which prompts 
action that Mr. Binney framed his app-roved def-
inition of a charitable trust in his argument in the 
Girard will case : ''Whatever is given for the love 
of God, or the love of your neighbor, in the catho-
lic and universal sense, given from these motives 
and to these ends, free from the stain or taint of 
every consideration that is a personal, private, or 
selfish." Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 128, 
11 L. Ed. 205 (1844) which is quoted by the Su-
preme Court in Ould v. Washington I-Iospital, 
95 U.S. 311, 24 L. Ed. 450. Charity means such 
unselfish things as are wont to be done by those 
who are animated by the virtue of love. Thus the 
Supreme Court of the United States, following 
Chancellor Kent, Lord Lyndhurst, and Lor·d Cam-
den, has defined a ·charitable trust as ''a gift to 
a general public use which extends to the poor as 
well as to the rich." Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 506, 
16 L. Ed. 701 ( 1860). So, also, Mr. Justice Gray 
speaking for the Supreme Court of lVIassachusetts 
in Jackson v. Phillip~s, 14 Allen 556 (1867), de-
clared a charitable gift to be one "for the benefit 
of an indefinite number of persons, either by 
bringing their minds or hearts under the influence 
of education or religion, by relieving their bodies 
from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting 
them to establish themselves in life, or by erect-
ing or maintaining publie buildings or \Yorks or 
otherwise lessening the bur·dens of government.'' 
"It ·cannot he doubted that Mr. Bok's gift was 
a charitable gift as the word "charitable" is used 
and understood by courts and lavvmaking bodies. 
What he did was done for the love of his neighbors 
in the community which he had adopted as his 
home. Every activity recognized by the awards 
that have been made is an activity for the promo-
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tion of which a charitable trust might be created. 
A trust for popular education in music, or for 
making higher education accessible to the many, 
or for stimulating American patriotism by recall-
ing the unselfish sacrifices of the fathers, or for 
the relief of human suffering through new and 
improved surgical methods, or for the encourage-
ment of craftsmanship, or for the beautification 
of a city, would be a charitable trust tested by any 
of the definitions which the authorities supply. 
And if a trust for the promotion of any one of 
these interests would be a charitable trust, it 
follows that a foundation to promote all of them 
is a trust that partakes of the nature of each.'' 
It should be noted furthermore that ·charity is not 
confined to the financial aid of the poor or indigent, but 
may be devoted to increasing and fostering qualities of 
industry, loyalty, persistence or for the desire for educa-
tion and general betterment of individuals as ·citizens. 
All of these are clearly for the public good and for the 
advancement and protection of society. A short defini-
tion of "charitable" in its legal sense in construing stat-
utes of this type has been frequently set out as ":some 
public benefit open to an indefinite number of persons." 
Public benefits, however, cannot be given a narrow const-
ruction such as would confine it to cases where a person 
is taken off the State relief rolls, or where an orphan is 
taken out of a state orphan institution. Public benefit 
embraces a much wider and all inclusive meaning, and 
is set forth in the Bok case above. In the case of Harrison 
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v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F. 2d 286 (C.C.A.7.) the 
Court V{as dealing with a corporation primarily devoted 
to the g'ranting of pensions to employees of a specified 
corporation. The Court says, on page 288: 
"In the present cases neither the appellee nor 
the donor was a hen,eficiary or interested either 
directly or indirectly in the dissolved company. 
The persons to whom annuities "\\Tere paid were 
those who had remained loyal in the service of the 
retired company and who had proved their stead-
fastness of character by long years 'Of service. 
Elements taken into consideration were years of 
service, age, marital status and the offspring of 
the persons to whom annuities should be paid, and 
at the time annuitants becam'e the recipients they 
must have reached the ordinarily alloted span of 
life in order to receive in their old age their re-
wards. for fidelity, steadfastness and persistence 
in industry. For this purpose the donor was in-
spired to create the fund and to reward them by 
annuities. The inevitable effect of such action was 
to encourage, generally, among employers, the de-
sire to promote similiar rewards for the qualities 
mentioned and, among employees, industry, per-
sistence of effort, and loyalty. Clearly such pur-
poses are charitable as Congress has used the 
'vord in the exemption statutes, as the Courts 
have construed the same. 
"* * * * 
"Appellant insists that ap·pellee was not oper-
ated exclusively for exempt purposes. But we 
have observed that many purely ·charitable organi-
zations were beneficiaries in the fund and that 
the only question as to exemption of all funds is 
that urged as to the sums paid out in the form of 
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annuities. And we have seen that the purpose of 
the latter payments were praiseworthy and the 
inevitable effect the encouragement and pro-
motion of habits upon the part of employer and 
employees, tending to the greater good of the 
whole body politic. The fact that some annuitant 
may not need the pension is immaterial, just as in 
one of the cited cases the fact that persons who 
had performed unusual services and thus would 
become entitled to rewards might not need the 
same. There is no taint of personal or selfish 
motives. The donor gained nothing except to pro-
mote a plan of just reward to persons to whom 
she owed nothing, for virtues worthy of emulation 
in people generally; ~to ·satisfy a desire to see that 
loyal employees should be rewarded and not live 
in want or indigent circumstances." 
It should be further understood, as set out in the 
Harrison case just eited, that a s~tatute providing for ex-
emption from taxes of corporations or foundations for 
relief, charitable, scientific, literary or educational pur-
poses will be liberally -construed, since exemption is a 
matter of grace, and an act of public justice. In other 
words, when dealing with the question of ·exemption, or 
a corporation organized for these purposes, the general 
rule that the exemptions must be specific, clear and un-
equivocal does not apply and the statute should be given 
a liberal interpretation in order to more completely real-
ize its basic aim. C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, ( C.C.A. 3) 190 F'. 2d 120; U. S. v. 
Proprietors of Social Law Library (C. C. A. 1) 102 F 2d. 
481. 
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The restriction of the beneficiaries to a designated 
group or class does not deny .the exempt ·classification. In 
the editorial :comment found in C. C. H. (Custom Clear-
ing House, Inc.) Federal Tax Reporter Se·ction 656.02, 
i·t is said: 
"As to charitable organizath)ns the depart-
ment announced ~that the term ''charitable'' in its 
legal sense 'contemplates some public benefit open 
to an indefinite number of persons.' Accordingly, 
an association organized and operated for the 
purpose of administering a fund w·hich "\Yas to be 
used for the benefit of those who made regular 
contributions, thereto, or their dep.endents, was 
not exempt. ( S. l\1:. 3028, IV -1 CB 215). Similiar 
holdings were made S. M. 5699 (V-1 CB 80) and 
G. ·C. M. 1268 (VI-1 CB 83). On the other hand, 
the Board held that the exemption was not intend-
ed to apply ~to 'public charities' only, stating: 
'We do not think that the mere restriction of the 
beneficiaries of an other\\rise charitable eorpora-
~tion to a designated group or class is sufficient 
ground upon which to deny exempt classifica-
tion." * * * Following that decision the Commis-
sioner in G. C. M. 19028 (1937-2 CB 125) ruled 
that an employees' organization administering a 
fund to which the employees contributed a minor 
portion was exempt. '' 
There are innumerable cases wherein the designation 
of charitable organizations was given to group of assoc-
iates designed f'Or the benefit of a special exclusive 
group. In Y.M.C.A. Retirement Fund, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 139, 
and Rike, 18 B.T.A. 149, a eorporation to provide retire-
ment annuities for superannuated or disabled secretaries 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
of the Y.l\l.C.A. which derives its funds from public con-
tributions and fron1 volunteer contributions of associates 
and members of the Y.M.C.A., no part of which inured to 
the benefit of any private individual, was exempt. This 
ruling was acquiesced in by the Treasury Department. In 
other \vords, a group was ·charitable when its sole purpose 
\Vas to provide retirement salaries for secretaries of the 
Y.M.C.A. We submit there can be no more clearly de-
fined or exclusive group of beneficiaries than these. 
In G. C. l\II. 19028, 1937-2 CB 125 the General Counsel 
of the Treasury Department held that an organization 
engaged in administering a fund consisting ~of amounts 
contributed by the employees and the employers and 
others, for financial relief of employees or their families, 
(police officers) is a charitable organization if the em-
ployee beneficiaries contribution to the fund represents 
a minor portion of the corporation's incon1e. This ruling 
revoked S.M. 3028 (IV-1, CB 80) \vhich denied exemption 
\Vhere benefits \vere limited to a prescribed class of 
employees of a certain manufacturer, and G. C. M. 1268 
(VI-1, CB 83), vvhich denies exemption where benefits 
vvere confined to n1embers of the association and vvere de-
pendent on regular payment of dues, and \vhere payments 
of benefits vvas not discretionary. 
The Treasury Departn1ent has also acquiesced in the 
case of Sibley, 16 B. T.A. 915, which declared 'a corpora-
tion operated solely to expend sick and disability aid to 
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a specific department store's employees, deriving its in-
come solely fro1n contributions and interest on invest-
Inents, \Vas exempt. 
In the case of Gimbel v. C'Ommissioner ·of Internal 
Revenue, 54, F. 2d 780, a foundation whose don1inant 
purpose was to grant pensions to those who served 
Gimbel Brothers, Inc. for over 25 y·eHrs \Vas held to be 
an exempt corporation; this ease cites as auth·ority such 
cases as Bok v. MeCaughn, 42 F. 2d 616; Mutual Aid 
an·d Benefit A·sS'ociation of Forstmann and Huffmann 
Employees v. Con1missioner, 42 F. 2d 619; Sibley 16 
B. T .A. 915; Eagen v. Commissioner, 43 F 2d 881; 
Y.M.C.A. Retirement Fund, 18 B.T.A. 139. The case 
says as follo\vs : 
"In reaching the conclusion to exempt these 
contributions to charity, we feel, as said in the 
Bok case, we do not 'defeat the obvious purpose 
of Congress to encourage gifts of the class under 
consideration' and we are in accord with Horace 
Binney's definition of charity and quote viz.: 
'whatever is given for * * * the love of thy neigh-
bor * * * given from these motive·s and to these 
ends, free from the strain or taint of every con-
sideration that is personal, p·rivate, or selfish.' " 
In the ease of Harrison v. Barker Annuity ~F'und, 
90 F. 2d 286, it is said, on page 289 : 
"In the language of 2 Bogert, Trusts and 
Tru'Stees, par. 362, P. 1093: 'Lastly a trust 1nay 
have as its o:bject the improvement' of the condi-
tion of a definite group of known individuals in 
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a mental, n1oral or physical \vay. Here the cestuis 
are fron1 the beginning fixed and identifiable and 
are always to he such. There is to be no addition 
to the class. F·or example·, a pubiic subscription 
may be taken for the victims of a certain flood, 
fire, or tornado. Here the persons who suffered 
physical injury or lost property a~s a result of this 
event n1ay v1ell be easily discoverable In a short 
ti1ne the trustees of the fund could learii the na1nes 
and addresses of all the members of the class. 
The benefits to 'be conferred are of the type which 
usually validate charitable trusts; that is, they 
involve the relief of sickness, injury, and poverty. 
Shall the fact that these benefits are to go to defi-
nite persons make the trust private~ It would 
see1n here that each court 'Should decide for itself 
\vhether the size of the class to be aided is such 
that there is a general public interest in the carry-
ing out of the trust, or whether the relief is so 
limited in amount as to 1nake it solely a matter of 
interest of the individual sufferers.' We conclude 
that the appellee is exe1npt from the taxes asses-
sed vvithin the meaning of the statute." 
In the case of An2y Hu,tchison Crellin v. Com.mission-
er, 46 B. T. A. 1152, there was created a trust providing, 
an1ong other things, as follows: 
"Eighth: That this Trust Agreement has for 
its purpose the· giving of assistance in the educa-
tion of youth and in particular the giving of fi-
nancial aid to persons of college age whose cir-
cumstances prohibit such advantage's. 
(A) That to this end the fallowing persons shall 
first become eligible to receive financial aid and 
may apply for such aid under the following condi-
tions: 
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(Here foliows a list of the names of fourteen per-
sons, the grandnephews and grandnieees of Amy 
Hutchison Crellin.) 
(B) That funds in the hands of the Foundation 
which are not required to carry out the p~rovisions 
of this Trust Agreement under paragraph "A" of 
this Article "Eighth", sub-paragraphs 1 to 6, both 
inclusive, shall he (Used for educ.a:tional aid to 
young members of the First Methodist Church 
of Pasa~dena, Pasadena, ·California. The condi-
tions for such aid shall he stipulated by the Foun-
dation, and may be in the form of loans or gifts." 
lt is to be noted that this Fnundation was for two 
pu-rpose'S: First, the financial aid to fourteen named, 
living grandnephews and grandnieces ; and, second, loans 
or gifts to young members of a designated church. Four 
applications by church members were approved in 1941 
and the loans ma:de. 
·On page 1155 of the opinion of the Board, the Board 
held: 
"If the trust had designated as beneficiaries 
oniy those stated in ~subdivision B, the statutory 
exemption would hardly he doubtful. Such a trust 
would he a means of providing for education, with-
out p·ersonal sp~ecification or identification, of the 
young people of a church of the cormnunity, and 
this would be enough to establish the charitable 
character of the trust. In re Henders'On's Estate, 
112 Pac. (2d) 605; In re Willey's Estate, 128 Ca. 
1; 60 Pac. 471." 
The trust in this opinion was held to be non-charit-
able, however, because its p·ri~ary purpose was deter-
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mined to be the educational provision for the fourteen 
nan1ed individuals. On page 1156 the Board says: 
~'Behind the instru1nent, the evidence sh:ows 
that the trust vva.s 'born of the settlor'·s desire to 
provide education for her fourteen grandnephews 
and grandnieces, ·~ * ·~. On the excess of the fund 
is to be devoted to the education of young people 
of the church; and in view of the amount of the 
fund and the number of prirnary beneficiaries, it 
is apparent that the aid provided for the church 
n1e1nbers is incidental to the 1na.in object of the 
trust. 
''For this rea;son, it can not be said that the 
trust is a public charitable trust; the exemption 
is defeated by the specific enumeration of the 
settlor's grandnephe\vs and grandnieces as the in-
dividual beneficiaries." 
This ease is noteworthy on two points: (A) A trust 
es1a~blished to provide funds for loans for educational 
purposes is charitable vvithin the meaning of the statute 
and en titles a corporation to exemp·tion. This case also 
recognizes sueh a eorporation to be charitable and does so 
\vithout dispute. (B) A group, such as "the young people 
of the First l\iethodist Church of Pasadena, Pasadena, 
California," ean be recipients of the benefits of a. trust 
and still the trust is charitable in nature. Under the 
~[errill Family Foundation, all descendant·s, and hus-
bands and \Vives of descendants, are eligible. This is 
certainly no n1ore restrictive than is the provision in the 
Crellin Trust for the young people of the First Methodist 
Church ·of Pasadena. The Crellin Trust was held non-
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charitable, because its predominant purpose was the edu-
cation of fourteen nan1ed people. It was, however, held 
to be unquestionably entitled to he classed as charitable 
if it had included only the beneficiaries designated as 
"the young people of the First Methodist Church of 
Pasadena." There appears to be no valid distinction be-
tween this class of beneficiaries design a ted in the Crellin 
Trust and the class of Beneficiaries de signa ted in the 
Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. 
In the ca'Se of Emerit E. Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
40 B. T. A. 555, a c.orp·oration was formed for the follow-
Ing purposes : 
"The object for which it is formed is to use its 
property, funds and income for any or all of the 
following purposes; To establish, build, improve 
and maintain parks, public grounds, public build-
ings, public baths and play grounds, and contri-
bute to the support of any of the foregoing de-
scr~bed projections or institutions; to help and aid 
cri P'P·led · rchildr~n ;, · {to render financial aid to 
worthy young people seeking an education; to re-
ceive and accept gifts, bequests and devises. * * *" 
Here again a corporation was held to be charitable, 
whose purpose included rendering financial aid to 
worthy young p·eople seeking an education. It is to be 
noted also that a later restriction placed on this grant 
by wish of the donor in his will restricted the financial 
aid for education "preferably for the -children of em-
ployees of Kewanee Boiler Company * * * ." (See page 
557). Here again a charitable corporation was for a 
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group ·of beneficiaries even n1ore restrictive than those 
in the ~fer rill Farnily F·ounda tion, and the charitable 
corporation was for the purpose of rendering financial 
aid to 'vorthy young people seeking an education. It is 
further interesting to note that student loans were grant-
ed, and as is stated on page 559 : 
''The student loans "\vere all secured by pronl-
i'ssory notes payable to petitioner six years from 
date, 'vith interest at 6 percent per annum from 
the date of maturity." 
And on page 559, the Court states: 
"There can be no doubt, and apparently the 
respondent does not contend otherwise, that the 
objects and purposes for which the petitioner was 
organized Ineet the require1nents of the statute 
for exen1ption from tax. They were purely char-
itable and educational." 
POINT II. 
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC. 
IS EXEMPT AS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND 
OPERATED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. 
The statute also exempts organizations which are 
organized for educational pu1~oses. Here again the 
"\vord educational must be construed in its broadest 
sense and i's not confined to associations which operate 
schools or colleges. In C. C. H. (Custom Clearing 
House, Inc.), Standard Federal Tax Reporter, Sec-
tion 656.02 it is said that educational institutions need 
not be schools or colleges in order to be exempt. Section 
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654 of the above cited voltune states that an educational 
organization within the meaning of the Internal Re~enue 
Code is one designed primarily for the improve1nent 
or development of the capa:.bilities of the individual. 
The educational purpose n1ay he one designed for the 
benefit of an undivided nUlll!ber of persons. by bringing 
their minds and hearts under the influence of education 
and to 1nake higher education accessible (Bok v. Mc-
Ca,·ughn, 42 F. 2d 616). 
As examples of the wide scope of the meaning of 
"educa~tional", the following are submitted: 
"A corporation organized to maintain a hand 
for giving free p~ublic concerts and the promotion 
of musical art is exempt as an educational insti-
tution, the terms not being confined to colleges 
and schools (I.T. 1475, 1-2 ·C.B. 184.) Tills bulle-
tin of the Income Tax Division of the Internal 
Revenue Bureau goes on to say that the fostering 
of an appreciation or a desire of good music and 
of the promotion of musical art are actually of 
an educational nature. 
An ass-ociation organized and operated ex-
clusively for giving musical concerts vvas exempt 
as education. S.M. 1176, 1 C.B. 147. 
The N a:tional Tax Association is exempt, be-
ing organized and op·erated exclusively for scien-
tific and educ.a.tiona1 purposes ( sp,ecial rule, Feb-
ruary 11, 1939, 393 C. C. H., paragrap11 6180). 
College stud.ents leagu.e, organized to bring 
about an open-1n1nded consideration of social in-
' 
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dustrial, political and international questions, was 
exempt as exclusively educational (I.T. 1224, I-1 
C.B. 256). 
It is, of c.ourse, a stated purpose of the Merrill Fami-
ly Foundation to grant loans to any and all descendants 
and the husbands or wives of such descendants of Mar-
riner \V. nierrill. This clearly is for the fostering of edu-
cation to assure that the benefits of education may be 
taken advantage of by increasing nurnbers of people, all 
of \vhich is certainly toward the common good of the 
public and of society. The purposes to he accomplished 
are certainly not limited to personal or private conc.ern, 
as the funds are available to any and all of those who 
con1e \vithin its classification no matter how far removed 
or rernote. The granting of a loan to enable a student in 
the year 2000 to attend a college in the United States is 
eertainly no personal benefit to the memhers of the cur-
rent Board of Directors and is certainly no personal or 
private concern of them. It should further he noted that 
the beneficiaries of the F'oundation are certainly not 
lin1ited to those whose last names might be ~lerrill, as 
the husband of a female descendant of Marriner W. 
}Ierrill qualifies for a loan. 
The cases of A1ny Hutchison Crellirn and Enter·it E. 
Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, cited above, are, we, submit, 
square authority that a corporation designed to give fi-
nancial aid, by way of loans to persons for educational 
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purposes, co1nes \Yithin the language of the exen1ption 
statute and rather than to quote the pertinent portions of 
those decisions again, reference is made here\vith to them. 
POINT III. 
NO PART OF THE NET EARNINGS OF THE ·CORPORATION 
INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF ANY PRIVATE 
SHAREHOLDER OR INDIVIDUAL. 
The Foundation has, essentially, three sources of 
funds. One is the voluntary gifts and contributions fron1 
individuals (Article I, Section Two of By-Laws) without 
restriction and from anyone, he he member or non-
member; another is the funds derived from the Annual 
Member who pays a minin1mn annual fee of $1.00 per 
year and the Sustaining Member who pays $100.00, who 
are restricted to descendants of Marriner W. Merrill ori 
any person who 1narries a descendant. (Article II of the 
By-Laws) The third is from whatever interest or returns 
are realized from the investment of funds. 
' 
There is no provision whatever for payn1ent of divi-
dends, bonuses, gratuities, or any sums in any form to 
the members. They cannot, under the corporation charter 
and By..:Laws, realize any return as a result of their 
meln'bership~. The membership· dues are in a fixed amount, 
bearing no relationship to the funds of the corporation 
or its net earnings, and there is certainly no provision 
wh-ereby the membership dues would be reduced if the 
income of the corporation becomes large. No mem·ber 
is entitled to a single benefit-either pecuniary or in 
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property-from his me1nhership. His only benefit is the 
well-recognized benefit of personal satisfaction and the 
satisfying of the desire to help those who are less for-
tunate. 
The record in the proceedings bears this out. On 
T -11, ~1r. n1errill states : 
''MR. MERRILL: No, the beneficiaries are 
not members of tha.t. They don't have to be Inem-
hers of the corporation, and in these instances are 
not Inembers of the corporation. 
"The money is donated with the understand-
ing as provided in the Affidavit and By-Laws 
without any refund or return to the donors of any 
kind or character, or by way of interest or divi-
dends or otherwise; and that money is used exclu-
sively in the future for the purpose of loaning 
money to students within the qualifications men-
tioned to go to college in any part of the world. 
And the objective of the Foundation is to provide 
for educational development of individuals that 
the Board of Directors may determine are within 
the rights under the Affidavit to make the loan." 
This was considered as testimony under oath and 
there is nothing whatever in the record to rebut it. 
While it is true that a member may secure financial 
assistance- for education, yet this assistance is in no way 
dependent upon his being a member. The By-Laws ex-
pressly provide (Article V. Section 2) that those who 
receive assistance need not he members. If a n1ember did 
receive such hel·p, it would have to be on the san1e footing 
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and basis as a non-member, ,vith the sa.n1e obligations. 
That some of the members may receive help, does not 
destroy the~ exemption. For exan1ple, 1nemhers of the 
American Legion may be beneficiaries of its fund for 
disabled veterans, hut the fund itself would not be de-
prived of its exemption. (C. C. H. F'ederal Tax Reporter, 
Section 656.04). A member of the Polio Foundation or 
Red Cross may receive aid, not because he \vas a Ineln-
ber, b~ut because of his need, and that would not deprive 
the fund of its exemption. 
The case of Bohemian Gyrnnastic Asso. Sokol of 
City of New York v. Higgins, 14 7 Fd 77 4 is, in this regard, 
of some importance. Therein the Association "\Vas con-
sidered educational, with no benefits inuring to share-
holders or individuals. Membership dues and the running 
of a commercial bar and restaurant provided the funds. 
The court, on page 777, states: 
"If Bohemian were a 1nere social club such 
receip~ts from persons other than 1ne1nbers n1ight 
he regarded as earnings from a business beyond 
normal corp·orate purposes and ordinary returns 
from investments of its property, and also n1ight 
be regarded as inuring to the benefit of its mem-
bers by lessening their dues. We have construed 
statutory exen1ptions some\Yha.t na.rro,vly in the 
case of social clubs and have treated income de-
rived hy them from outside sources if consider-
B1hle in. a1nount .and recurrent, as d~stroying the 
exemption. But In the case of educational or chari-
table corporations the exemption is construed 
broadly as we held that it should be in Roche's 
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Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 776, 779, 
supra. See also Helvering v. Bliss, 193 U. S. 144, 
150 55 S. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed. 246, 95 A.L.R. 207; 
Jones v. Better Business Bureau of ·Oklahoma 
City, 10 Cir., 123 F. 2d 767, 769; United States y. 
I)roprietors oif Social La\v Lihra.ry, 1 Cir., 102 
F. 2d 481, 482. If so construed, the words 'inure 
to fhe benefit' would, we think, require son1e bene-
fit other than mere membership and a possible 
reduction in the amount of dues contributed to 
the very educational or charitable objeets for 
which the corporation vvas organized. By this 
interpretation of the exemption clause the very 
reasonable decision of the First Circuit in United 
States v. Proprietors of Social Law Lihrary, 102 
F. 2d 481, supra, can be reconciled with the Jockey 
Club and West Side Tennis Club decisions, supra, 
where we dealt only with the exemption in rela-
tion to social clubs. 
"The benefit that is conferred upon the mem-
bers in the ca:se at bar is really an opportunity 
to receive and promote a certain type of education. 
Their contributions in the way of dues, whether 
more or less in amount, are also for educational 
purposes. We cannot believe that the statute wa:s 
ever intended to preclude an exen1ption in such 
a case. The result n1ight be to deprive a religious, 
charitable or educational corporation which raised 
money through entertainn1ents or some business 
not representing its primary objects of any ex-
emption, if organized with members paying trif-
ling dues, and to grant an exemption if no dues 
were to be paid. The distinction seems to us an 
unreal one. We think an exemption under the 
present circun1stances has never been denied." 
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InN orthu:estern Jobbers' Credit Bureau v. CoJnuzis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 37 F. 2d 880, the Court de-
fines the phrase "inures to the benefit of any private-
shareholder or individual" as "meaning to serve to the 
use or benefit of such shareholders." See also C ornn~is­
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Orton, 173 F. 2d 483, 488. 
It is submitted that a dollar donated to this Foundation 
would no more inure to the benefit of the donor than 
would a dollar donated to the Red Cross, the Polio Foun-
dation, the University of Utah, or the church of the 
donor's choice. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion has been for the purpose of 
pointing out that the l\1arriner W. l\ferrill Fan1ily F·oun-
dation, Inc. meets each and every test in1posed by the 
exemption statute. It is submitted that the Foundation 
clearly meets all requirements and should be held to con1e 
within the statute granting the exemptions. 
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